Search for: All records

This work focuses on the problem of distributed optimization in multiagent cyberphysical systems, where a legitimate agent’s iterates are influenced both by the values it receives from potentially malicious neighboring agents and by its own self-serving target function. We develop a new algorithmic and analytical framework to achieve resilience for the class of problems where stochastic values of trust between agents exist and can be exploited. In this case, we show that convergence to the true global optimal point can be recovered, both in mean and almost surely, even in the presence of malicious agents. Furthermore, we provide expected convergence rate guarantees in the form of upper bounds on the expected squared distance to the optimal value. Finally, numerical results are presented that validate our analytical convergence guarantees even when the malicious agents compose the majority of agents in the network and where existing methods fail to converge to the optimal nominal points. 

Rendezvous with sperm whales for biological observations is made challenging by their prolonged dive patterns. Here, we propose an algorithmic framework that codevelops multiagent reinforcement learning–based routing (autonomy module) and synthetic aperture radar–based very high frequency (VHF) signal–based bearing estimation (sensing module) for maximizing rendezvous opportunities of autonomous robots with sperm whales. The sensing module is compatible with low-energy VHF tags commonly used for tracking wildlife. The autonomy module leverages in situ noisy bearing measurements of whale vocalizations, VHF tags, and whale dive behaviors to enable time-critical rendezvous of a robot team with multiple whales in simulation. We conducted experiments at sea in the native habitat of sperm whales using an “engineered whale”—a speedboat equipped with a VHF-emitting tag, emulating five distinct whale tracks, with different whale motions. The sensing module shows a median bearing error of 10.55° to the tag. Using bearing measurements to the engineered whale from an acoustic sensor and our sensing module, our autonomy module gives an aggregate rendezvous success rate of 81.31% for a 500-meter rendezvous distance using three robots in postprocessing. A second class of fielded experiments that used acoustic-only bearing measurements to three untagged sperm whales showed an aggregate rendezvous success rate of 68.68% for a 1000-meter rendezvous distance using two robots in postprocessing. We further validated these algorithms with several ablation studies using a sperm whale visual encounter dataset collected by marine biologists. 

We develop a resilient binary hypothesis testing framework for decision making in adversarial multi-robot crowdsensing tasks. This framework exploits stochastic trust observations between robots to arrive at tractable, resilient decision making at a centralized Fusion Center (FC) even when i) there exist malicious robots in the network and their number may be larger than the number of legitimate robots, and ii) the FC uses one-shot noisy measurements from all robots. We derive two algorithms to achieve this. The first is the Two Stage Approach (2SA) that estimates the legitimacy of robots based on received trust observations, and provably minimizes the probability of detection error in the worst-case malicious attack. For the Two Stage Approach, we assume that the proportion of malicious robots is known but arbitrary. For the case of an unknown proportion of malicious robots, we develop the Adversarial Generalized Likelihood Ratio Test (A-GLRT) that uses both the reported robot measurements and trust observations to simultaneously estimate the trustworthiness of robots, their reporting strategy, and the correct hypothesis. We exploit particular structures in the problem to show that this approach remains computationally tractable even with unknown problem parameters. We deploy both algorithms in a hardware experiment where a group of robots conducts crowdsensing of traffic conditions subject to a Sybil attack on a mock-up road network. We extract the trust observations for each robot from communication signals which provide statistical information on the uniqueness of the sender. We show that even when the malicious robots are in the majority, the FC can reduce the probability of detection error to 30.5% and 29% for the 2SA and the A-GLRT algorithms respectively. 

We address the problem of learning the legitimacy of other agents in a multiagent network when an unknown subset is comprised of malicious actors. We specifically derive results for the case of directed graphs and where stochastic side information, or observations of trust, is available. We refer to this as “learning trust” since agents must identify which neighbors in the network are reliable, and we derive a learning protocol to achieve this. We also provide analytical results showing that under this protocol i) agents can learn the legitimacy of all other agents almost surely, and ii) the opinions of the agents converge in mean to the true legitimacy of all other agents in the network. Lastly, we provide numerical studies showing that our convergence results hold for various network topologies and variations in the number of malicious agents. 

We develop a resilient binary hypothesis testing framework for decision making in adversarial multi-robot crowdsensing tasks. This framework exploits stochastic trust observations between robots to arrive at tractable, resilient decisionmaking at a centralized Fusion Center (FC) even when i) there exist malicious robots in the network and their number may be larger than the number of legitimate robots, and ii) the FC uses one-shot noisy measurements from all robots.We derive two algorithms to achieve this. The first is the Two Stage Approach (2SA) that estimates the legitimacy of robots based on received trust observations, and provably minimizes the probability of detection error in the worst-case malicious attack. Here, the proportion of malicious robots is known but arbitrary. For the case of an unknown proportion of malicious robots, we develop the Adversarial Generalized Likelihood Ratio Test (A-GLRT) that uses both the reported robot measurements and trust observations to estimate the trustworthiness of robots, their reporting strategy, and the correct hypothesis simultaneously. We exploit special problem structure to show that this approach remains computationally tractable despite several unknown problem parameters.We deploy both algorithms in a hardware experiment where a group of robots conducts crowdsensing of traffic conditions on a mock-up road network similar in spirit toGoogleMaps, subject to a Sybil attack.We extract the trust observations for each robot from actual communication signals which provide statistical information on the uniqueness of the sender.We show that even when the malicious robots are in the majority, the FC can reduce the probability of detection error to 30.5% and 29% for the 2SA and the A-GLRT respectively.